Makkot – “Lashes” – The Mind of Dan Perlman

Makkot – “Lashes” – Whip It, Whip It Good

Originally, Makkot was simply the second part of Sanhedrin, the tractate we just finished. While the former focused on the design of the court system and its overall responsibilities for various types of crimes, Makkot focuses on the Bet Din, the Halakhic court, i.e., the rabbinical court that judges violations of religious law. More specifically, the tractate covers three subjects: false witnesses (thou shalt not lie/bear false witness); sanctuary cities (you thought those were a new, California based thing, right?); and punishment by flogging (lashes).
4/10/25, Chapter 1, Page 2 – In Sanhedrin we covered mostly crimes that were punishable by the death penalty. As an intro to “bearing false witness”, the rabbis note that in a case where one conspires to have someone put to death by the courts and is later found to have lied, he is punished with the same penalty he sought for his victim. In cases that involve a different punishment, the same is considered the standard – a similar monetary fine, or jail time as was sought. But, in some cases, that either isn’t possible, or would have adverse consequences on innocents, like the liar’s children, and instead, the court opts for public flogging as a deterrent.
4/11/25, Page 3 – Rav Yehuda, out of the blue in a discussion about loan repayment, announces that the act of cutting the fabric of a shirt to create the neck opening violates the Sabbath prohibitions on work. Rav Kahana objects, noting that one is allowed to remove the stopper from a wine barrel to create an opening. Rava says he’s full of it, after all, one isn’t drilling the opening, which would be prohibited, but just removing the stopper, which is a part of its purpose. My takeaway, wine corks exist to be removed!
4/12/25, Page 4 – Another tangent and a mildly deep dive into mikvahs, the ritual baths. The water in these must be naturally occurring, more or less stagnant, water and cannot be directly transported by human intervention. So, rainwater, seawater, lake water, but not river water, which is constantly moving. If you top up a ritual bath with non naturally collected water, like, say a barrel from a tap, there are limits on the ratio of that that affect the purity of the bath, but if you stay below that, it is assumed that the impure water becomes purified on contact with the purified. Not so for other substances, like spilled wine, which it is recommended you drink rather than bathe in.
4/13/25, Page 5 – A pair of witnesses swear that they overheard an accused murderer plotting to kill someone on, say, Tuesday, June 14th. But later, a second pair of witnesses comes forward to point out that on that Tuesday, the first witnesses were somewhere else. The first pair realize they’ve made a mistake, it was Wednesday, June 15th when they overheard the plot. No matter to the rabbinical court, clearly they were conspirators, and even though the murder actually took place, as they said, the court sentences them to death for the conspiracy. We all know that eyewitness testimony is unreliable when it comes to details. Clearly these rabbis didn’t watch enough cop shows.
4/14/25, Page 6 – I’m a bit confused trying to follow this particular passage. They’re talking about disqualifying witnesses because of their personal relationship to either a murderer or sodomizer, both acts seem to be equally repugnant to those involved in the discussion. First, the rabbis pretty much all agree that the murderer or sodomizer is disqualified as a witness because of his personal stake in the outcome of the trial, so no testifying on his own behalf. But then, the victim – a sodomized victim is disqualified as a witness if he saw who did it to him, he can only testify if he was “taken from behind”, and then only to things unrelated to the identity of the sodomizer. But then, the real twist… a murder victim is disqualified from testifying because of his personal stake in the matter… umm, isn’t a murder victim… dead?
4/15/25, Chapter 2, Page 7 – We’ve encountered the topic of “intent” numerous times over the last few years of exploring the Talmud. But I feel like this time perhaps they’ve stretched the definition a bit too far. The example used is someone fixing a roof, and either using a roller to spread tar, or raising/lowering a barrel of tar, or climbing on a ladder. If, the rabbis decide, your action is away from potential danger – i.e., pulling the roller away from the edge, raising the barrel, or climbing up the ladder, and a slip occurs, and you or the barrel/roller falls on someone and kills them, it is considered unintentional and accidental. However, if you are pushing the roller towards the edge, lowering the barrel, or descending the ladder, and the slip occurs, then it is considered intentional, because you should have been more careful, and you are exiled.
4/16/25, Page 8 – We continue in the vein of intention, and a curious dive into unintended consequences of a mitzvah. Examples given are a father disciplining his son, a teacher disciplining a student, an agent of the court disciplining a prisoner. If those things are being performed as a mitzvah, the first two centering around Torah instruction, the last around a court’s sentence, and the victim dies, the perpetrator is found not liable for exile. If, on the other hand, they are disciplining the victim for something unrelated to Torah learning or a court sentence, then they are liable, and punished by exile. Pay attention in Torah class kids!
4/17/25, Page 9 – Exile as a punishment for unintentional murder appears to have been relatively common in the culture back then. There were restrictions on who could take advantage of exile, but the key parts, basically, were that the person had to be a Jew or a ger toshav, a non-Jew, living in Israel, who had accepted the Noahide laws, i.e., the Ten Commandments, basically. Exile was to one of six designated sanctuary cities, three on each side of the Jordan River (noting that both modern day Israel and Jordan were both predominately Jewish lands at the time). The person accepting exile was accompanied, at a run, by two Torah scholars whose job it was to talk down any avenging relatives of the victim should they approach.
4/18/25, Page 10 – The relationship between teacher and student was considered so sacred that if a Torah teacher was exiled for unintentionally killing someone, his entire school, students and all, are exiled with him so that he can continue to teach them. This feels like a very different relationship from the one I and my fellow students had with Mr. Ryan in 9th grade English Lit class.
4/19/25, Page 11 – The sages are off on another of their tangents as they discuss the grammar of various words used for God’s speech or instructions. Sometimes the Torah specifies dibbur, harsh speech, sometimes amira, neutral speech, at other times nidberu, gentle, calming speech, and also, at times, yadber, firm, but subduing speech. Most of the discussion is over why the first, harsh speech, is commanded for any conversations about exile. We also, in a side note, find out that Joshua wrote the final verses of the Torah, not Moses.
4/20/25, Page 12 – Samael, the Angel of Rome, archangel or fallen angel? Condemner of sins or bringer of destruction? Heavenly host or demonic cohort? One of the most controversial figures in biblical literature, he pops up again and again, in various guises and for various reasons. On today’s page he seeks to enter a sanctuary city after killing a Roman citizen. But he is turned away because a) it was an intentional killing, b) he went to a non-sanctuary city to claim sanctuary, and c) exile only applies to humans, not to angels. Besides, he’s trying to avoid being nabbed by God, and I’m not sure that hiding in a sanctuary city would work for that anyway.